Comparative Analysis of Economic Instruments in Intersection Operation:
  A User-Based Perspective by Lin, DianChao & Jabari, Saif Eddin
Comparative Analysis of Economic Instruments in
Intersection Operation: A User-Based Perspective
Dianchao Lin†, Saif Eddin Jabari,
Abstract—Focusing on different economic instruments imple-
mented in intersection operations under a connected environ-
ment, this paper analyzes their advantages and disadvantages
from the travelers’ perspective. Travelers’ concerns revolve
around whether a new instrument is easy to learn and operate,
whether it can save time or money, and whether it can reduce
the rich-poor gap. After a comparative analysis, we found that
both credit and free-market schemes can benefit users. Second-
price auctions can only benefit high VOT vehicles. From the
perspective of technology deployment and adoption, a credit
scheme is not easy to learn and operate for travelers.
Index Terms—connected vehicle, economic instrument, auc-
tion, transaction, credit, intersection, operation, benefit, user-
based
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic instruments are known to be powerful traffic
management tools, both theoretically and in practice (e.g.
dynamic tolls). Under limited road resources, economic in-
struments with demand management can better serve hetero-
geneous vehicles’ demand and improve overall social welfare.
Although Pigou has numerically argued that pricing strategies
are useful for improving social welfare in 1920 [1], their
real-world implementation has not been possible until today.
Inconvenience is one of the reasons that impede its actual
deployment. Traditional tolls (e.g., toll booths) introduce
delays to travelers. For example, paying for parking will result
in no less than 10-60 seconds time lost to every vehicle.
Thanks to RFID technology, tolling on the highway can be
carried out with zero delays to travelers. RFID cards and
gates can save people’s time substantially. However, tolling
gates and other facilities are usually expensive, and it has
yet not seen wide-spread implementation, especially in many
developing countries.
Today, we are witnessing major shifts in surface trans-
portation. Advanced information technology and connected
vehicle (CV) technology allows for direct vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, while auto-
pilot features allow the vehicles to perform driving maneuvers
autonomously (e.g., in response to the controls). This has
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given rise to several recent papers to use tolling or auctions
directly between vehicles for deciding on right-of-way (ROW)
or priority [2]–[5]. Auctions can be thought of as advanced
tolling schemes, whereby vehicles auction their time in ways
that capture heterogeneity in value of time (VOT). Some have
been used for intersection operation research and parking
management research [2]–[11]. In the intersection control
literature, auctions require vehicles to give prices for a priority
pass, and only vehicle(s) with a higher price(s) can pay
and pass with priority. There are two typical formats: open
auctions and sealed bid auctions [12]. Open auctions in-
clude ascending price auctions and descending price auctions;
sealed-bid auctions include first-price auctions, second-price
auctions, etc. Sealed bid auctions are more suitable for traffic
management without unduly burdening drivers.
Standard auction mechanisms are not revenue-neutral eco-
nomic instruments: travelers always need to pay an extra
amount of money to travel. It can worsen family finances,
especially for the poor, and unavoidably lead to public outcry
and political opposition. The credit auction schemes, which
may be originated from tradable network credits theory in
traffic network management [13], [14], can also be revenue-
neutral [5]. The credit is similar to a new currency, which
should be pre-distributed by the government freely and peri-
odically. Citizens can use it for travel and trade it in a trading
market. By controlling the amount of credit in circulation1,
the transport sector can also manage the generation of traffic
demand indirectly.
However, credit trading is itself time consuming and it
renders travel a more complex process. A recent departure
from auction-based mechanisms was the free-market mech-
anism introduced in [11], [15]–[18], in which vehicles pay
each other for right-of-way as opposed to paying a third party
(the system operator). Unlike auction-based approaches, these
direct transaction-based approaches have the advantage that
losers are directly compensated for “giving” priority.
All above mechanisms of economic instruments, includ-
ing auction, credit(credit auction), and direct-transaction(free-
market), are not easy to understand for citizens. Their con-
cerns are usually different from and more complicated than
the optimal objectives of theoretical models. Investigations are
showing that travelers’ major concerns include relative con-
venience, cost, speed, reliability, safety, comfort, environment
pollution, body health, and so on [19], [20]. We suppose that
different economic instruments have a similar influence on
1In traffic network management, the government can also control required
credit for passing a link
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safety, comfort, reliability, environment and health. Among
other things, they may care about: 1) whether a new measure
is easy to learn and operate; 2) whether it can save time
or money; and even 3) whether it is equity. Improvement
of social welfare (even a Pareto-improvement2) may also
widen the rich-poor gap. Focusing on the first and the second
concerns, this paper comparatively analyzes the influence of
different economics instruments for travelers.
The next section discusses what citizens need to do for their
travel under different economic instruments. The following
section analyzes citizens’ benefits under different financial
instruments. We transfer the time-saving options into mone-
tary income and use the benefit to represent the sum income
(transferred and real). This is followed by the last section,
which briefly discusses the rich-poor gap and concludes the
paper.
II. MANUAL OPERATION FOR TRAVELERS
Compared with auctions and direct-transactions, use of
credit schemes require additional credit trading work (II-A).
Also, all systems need to trade for priority at the intersec-
tion (II-B), and CV technology with the support of mobile
payment is also necessary. Some steps of the process can be
replaced by a machine, but other steps cannot.
A. Trade of credit in virtual market
The pre-distributed credit from the government will typi-
cally not be suitable in that the budget does not correctly align
with their travel needs. Trade of credit cannot be avoided.
Fig. 1 illustrates the basic process of trading credit budget.
Suppose the result of the step ”Estimate the budget of
all trips” is almost correct. The process in Fig. 1 will be
employed in two scenarios. 1) It happens at the beginning of
credit refreshment (old credits are scraped, and new credits
are distributed). 2) It starts if a traveler adds/cancels a trip
in his/her travel schedule. It is hard to say which scenario is
more likely, but it is clear that: if the period of credit redistri-
bution is shorter, scenario one will happen more frequently;
otherwise, scenario two will happen more frequently.
The color green represents the work of the step that can be
replaced/assisted by a machine. For example, we can imagine
that the credits in different cities are similar to different
stocks3. Travelers can know the prices and easily trade credits
by mobile payment.
The step ”estimate the budget of all trips” is a recombined
step, and it can be described by the process in Fig. 2. If there
are n trips, this process in Fig. 2 should be done n times.
At the beginning of Fig. 2, the input of travel information
cannot be done by a machine, and travelers have to decide
and provide such inputs themselves.
2an improvement only benefit some people with the other people un-
changed
3The credits should be homogeneous within the same traffic network, such
as the network of a city
Start
Estimate the budget of all trips
Is the budget
correct? End
Trade in the market Wait for a bettertrading time
End
yes
no
another choice
Fig. 1: Flow chart of trading credit budget.
Start
VOT Time schedule OD pair
Pick a route
Estimate the required credits in this trip
End
Fig. 2: Flow chart of credits estimation in one trip.
B. Trade for priority at intersections
Competition for priority at an intersection between two
vehicles (or vehicle groups) in conflicting approaches can be
treated as a game. Rules of the game can assume an auction,
direct-transaction, or some other reasonable mechanism. Such
a game is illustrated in Fig. 3.
C. General analysis
For auctions and direct-transactions, travelers only need
to provide their VOT compared with travel in a traditional
environment. The process is quite simple, easy to learn and
implement.
However, credit auctions are much more complicated.
Similar to the network credit scheme, the intersection credit
scheme should also be hard to attract travelers [21]. To
guarantee that the budget is appropriate for the trip, travelers
need to trade frequently, and this requires more time (as
part of the trip). If some travelers don’t want to incur these
Start
Input VOT & pick a route
Reach an intersection
Are there
conflicting
vehicles?
Determine schedule priority and play a game
Trade for passing priority
Reach the destination
End
yes
no
go to next intersection
Fig. 3: Flow chart of a trip for all market mechanisms.
additional delays, they have to pay for an increase in budget
to guarantee that the credit is enough for travel, and this can
result in wasted money because credit will inevitably devalue
and expire. Also, trading credit through an agent will result
in an additional charge [14].
III. ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS
A. Overview and notation
The game setting in this paper is one that is played
between pairs of vehicles. We consider the simple setting of
an intersection of two single-lane one-way streets. That is, we
consider two conflicting through movements. In our analysis
we take the position of one of the two vehicles involved in
a game, which we shall refer to as vehicle A, the subject
vehicle, and denote their VOT by vA. We refer to the other
vehicle as vehicle B, the opponent vehicle, and denote their
VOT by vB. Generally speaking, the games considered here
are symmetric and it, therefore, does not matter which vehicle
we assume to be the subject vehicle and which vehicle we
consider to be the opponent. We denote by tA (tB) the time
saved by vehicle A (vehicle B) should they win.
Both the time and money saved are important in the
implementation of economic instruments. The VOT is like
a bridge used to transfer time into money, and we consider
benefit B as the sum of money earned and transferred time
saved (converted to monetary units). For example, if vehicle
A with VOT vA = 2cents/s, gets passing priority and saves
tA = 2s, its time saved in monetary units is vAtA = 4cents.
But it pays 1 cent so that its benefit is B = 4− 1 = 3cents.
Here, the return rate of the game is α = 3/4 = 0.75 for
vehicle A.
In brief, we analyze different economic instruments in this
section:
1) First-price auctions. The higher bid wins and the winner
delivers the amount they bid in its entirety to a third party
operator in exchange for ROW or priority. Here, the return
rate of game α is always zero.
2) Second-price auctions. The player with the higher bid
also wins, but only delivers the loser’s (smaller) bid to the
operator. The α is (this vehicle is A):
α2auc =
{ vAtA−vBtB
vAtA
if A wins
0 if A loses
(1)
3) Credit with second-price auctions (we refer to it as credit
in this paper). Its benefit from the game is the same as the
benefit in the second-price auction (B2auc). However, out of
game, it still has money earned from credit distribution C,
and a loss because of credit trading LA. In this paper, we
suppose the money earned out of game is person-equal and
revenue-neutral, and its lost is about 10% of what it earns in
total. The credit benefit is:
Bcre = B2auc + C − LA. (2)
4) Direct transactions. The winner transfers a fraction
of their winnings to the loser and nothing to a third party
operator. We consider two rules for the value of αtra, the
first rule is αtra = 1/2, which has analytical support as a
side payment in a transferable utility game [11], [15]. The
second rule is that vehicle A keeps a fraction of their bid
equal to the proportion of their personal benefit to the total
personal benefit in the system: αtra = vAtA/(vAtA + vBtB).
The two rules can be amalgamated using a binary variable χ,
which applies the first rule when set to zero and applies the
second rule when set to one:
αtra =
(vAtA − 1)χ+ 1
(vAtA + vBtB − 2)χ+ 2 . (3)
In a sealed bid, vehicles do not know each other’s VOTs, so
from the perspective of each vehicle, the other vehicle’s VOT
is a random variable. We will also consider heterogeneity in
traffic conditions, so that time savings can also be treated as
random variables. We will quantify and analyze expected net
personal benefits and use these expectations to perform com-
parisons between the different game types. Use of expected
values is motivated by the law of large numbers: it represents
the benefits realized after playing a large number of games.
B. Input of calculation
In the calculations below, we assume that the probability
distributions of VOT and time saving (across the driving
population) are given. In this section, we pick a typical distri-
bution, log-normal distribution for both VOT and time saving.
We borrow the investigation results of VOT by Brownstone,
et, al in San Diego for fv [22]. As shown in Fig. 4, median
VOT is $30 per hour (0.8 cent per second). The upper quartile
is $43 per hour (1.2 cent per second), and the lower quartile
is $23 per hour (0.6 cent per second). In addition, considering
a mean discharging time of 2 second per vehicle at the
intersection, we design ft shown as in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 4: PDF of VOT.
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Fig. 5: PDF of time saving.
C. No abandonment and honest VOT reporting
The net personal benefits of the game are summarized in
Table I for the case when player A wins, and in Table II
for the case when player A loses. Because this is symmetric
for A and B, we just focus on vehicle A in the analysis. We
define:
β ≡ 1− α. (4)
TABLE I: Benefit of game when vehicle A wins
Game Net BenefitA (winner) B (loser) Operator
First-price auction 0 0 vAtA
Sec.-price auction α2aucvAtA 0 β2aucvAtA
Dir. transaction αtravAtA βtravAtA 0
The situation is trivial in this case for a first-price auction:
B1auc = EB1auc = 0 with probability 1. For a second-price
TABLE II: Net personal benefits when vehicle B wins
Game Net BenefitA (loser) B (winner) Operator
First-price auction 0 0 vBtB
Sec.-price auction 0 β2aucvBtB α2aucvBtB
Dir. transaction αtravBtB βtravBtB 0
auction, vehicle A knows their own VOT, but not B’s, so the
latter is random. The time savings shall also be assumed to
be random to represent variability in traffic conditions. From
Table I, the benefit of the game for A in a second-price auction
is
B2auc(vA, VB, TA, TB) = 1{vATA≥VBTB}αaucvATA, (5)
where 1{·} is an indicator function that returns 1 if · is true
and returns 0 otherwise. The expected benefit in the game to
A is given by
EB2auc(vA, VB, TA, TB) = E1{vATA≥VBTB}αaucvATA
= E
(
αaucvATA
∣∣vATA ≥ VBTB)P(vATA ≥ VBTB). (6)
The expected benefit for credit can be based on the ex-
pected benefit of second-price auctions in Eq. 2:
EBcre = EB2auc + C − ELA. (7)
In the case of a direct transaction game, there is a non-
negative net personal benefit to vehicle A whether they win
or lose. The net personal benefit is given by
Btra(vA, VB, TA, TB) =
1{vATA≥VBTB}αtravATA + 1{vATA<VBTB}αtravBTB (8)
and the expected personal benefit is
EBtra(vA, VB, TA, TB) =
E
(
αtravATA
∣∣vATA ≥ VBTB)P(vATA ≥ VBTB)+
E
(
αtravBTB
∣∣vATA < VBTB)P(vATA < VBTB). (9)
When a pair of vehicles cross a single-lane one-way
intersection, there is a basic scenario that both vehicles have
equal opportunity to pass with priority. That is similar to a
two-equal-phase control scenario. The Expected benefit in this
traditional environment is the expected basic benefit EBb in
this section.
We define expected extra benefit as any expected benefit
minus expected basic benefit. If it is larger than 0, travelers
can benefit from the economic instrument. Otherwise, travel-
ers cannot benefit from it.
Fig. 6 shows the expected extra benefit for different VOT
vehicles. The background shows the accumulated distribution
of VOT. Obviously, in a first-price auction system, people
can gain nothing and the extra benefit in just −EBb. They
will be indifferent to receiving right-of-way (ROW) or not.
A system that uses the second-price auctions is a system
that only benefits the rich. Vehicles with VOTs at and below
the median VOT will dislike the auction game and prefer
the traditional fairness control. The transaction game with
χ = 0 is rewarding the low VOT vehicles. They earn much
more in benefit in a transaction game than under traditional
control. For these top VOT vehicles, they can still gain
some additional benefits. The transaction game with χ = 1
is rewarding to the high VOT vehicles. At the same time,
the credit scheme is similar to a balance between the two
transaction cases.
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Fig. 6: Benefit in honest scenario.
D. Honest VOT reporting with abandonment
In this part, we suppose that the traditional traffic system
and the market-inspired system will both exist. A vehicle
predetermines whether to abandon the market-inspired system
before traveling. To this end, the binary variable γ represents
whether they choose to play the game (γ = 1) or not (γ = 0).
If either vehicle does not wish to play the game, then γ = 0.
When this is the case, there is a probability that a vehicle will
receive priority and a probability that they will not. Let pA
denote the probability that vehicle A receives priority when
γ = 0 and pB ≡ 1 − pA. If γ = 0 and vAtA ≥ vBtB, in
a first-price auction vehicle A’s net personal benefit is vAtA
with probability pA and zero with probability 1 − pA = pB,
so that on average vehicle A’s net personal benefit is pAvAtA.
Similar arguments can be made for vehicle B, other types of
games, and when vAtA < vBtB. The (mean) net personal
benefits of the game are summarized in Tables III and IV.
TABLE III: Net personal benefits when vAtA ≥ vBtB
Game Net BenefitA (winner) B (loser) Operator
First-price (1− γ)pAvAtA (1− γ)pBvBtB γvAtA
Sec.-price γα2aucvAtA+
(1− γ)pAvAtA (1− γ)pBvBtB γβ2aucvAtA
Dir. trans γαtravAtA+
(1− γ)pAvAtA
γβtravAtA+
(1− γ)pBvBtB 0
After all travelers’ choices are stable, the expected extra
benefits will be all equal or larger than zero shown as in Fig.
7. We use credit (0) to represent the policy that credits are
distributed to all travelers, and credit (1) to represent the pol-
icy that credits are only distributed to joiners. Fig. 7 indicates
TABLE IV: Net personal benefits when vAtA < vBtB
Game Net BenefitA (loser) B (winner) Operator
First-price (1− γ)pAvAtA (1− γ)pBvBtB γvBtB
Sec.-price (1− γ)pAvAtA γβ2aucvBtB+(1− γ)pBvBtB γα2aucvBtB
Dir. trans γαtravBtB+
(1− γ)pAvAtA
γβtravBtB+
(1− γ)pBvBtB 0
that, under 1st-price auctions, 2nd-price auctions, and normal
credit distribution (combined with 2nd-price auctions), all
travelers will inevitably abandon the market-mechanism. The
problem is that once some travelers find that abandonment
can benefit them, they will leave. And then these leavers will
lead to further abandonment of the other travelers. Note that
credit (1) is much harder to implement and costs a lot for the
government because it requires the exact knowledge of traffic
users every day.
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Fig. 7: Benefit in leaving scenario.
E. Dishonest VOT reporting without abandonment
Suppose that the government can only know citizens’
declared VOT. All travelers are still rational. To increase
net personal benefits, vehicles/drivers may place bids based
on false VOTs. We denote by v˜A the reported VOT and
allow dishonest VOTs to be drawn from different distributions
fV˜A for vehicle A and fV˜B for vehicle B. We also use the
notation α˜auc and α˜tra to indicate that these fractions are
calculated based on reported VOTs. The net personal benefits
realized are still based on true VOT. For example, if vehicle
A bids v˜AtA in a first-price auction and wins, their net
personal benefit is (vA − v˜A)tA. If system abandonment is
not allowed, net personal benefits in a system with dishonest
VOT reporting are summarized in Table V when vehicle A
wins and in Table VI when vehicle B wins. The declared VOT
distribution will keep dynamically changing. If the operator
also uses a dynamic economic instrument (for example, χ is
not fixed for the direct transaction), the benefit will also be
unstable.
After about 20 iterations, all expected extra benefits become
stable or repeatable. We show their values/mean values in Fig.
8.
TABLE V: Net personal benefits when v˜AtA ≥ v˜BtB
Game Net BenefitA (winner) B (loser) Operator
First-price (vA − v˜A)tA 0 v˜AtA
Sec.-price (vA − β˜2aucv˜A)tA 0 β˜2aucv˜AtA
Dir. trans (vA − β˜trav˜A)tA β˜trav˜AtA 0
TABLE VI: Net personal benefits when v˜AtA < v˜BtB
Game Net BenefitA (loser) B (winner) Operator
First-price 0 (vB − v˜B)tB v˜BtB
Sec.-price 0 (vB − α˜2aucv˜B)tB α˜2aucv˜BtB
Dir. trans α˜trav˜BtB (vB − α˜trav˜B)tB 0
It is clear that both credit and transaction games perform
well, but pure auction strategies can not make all travelers
happy.
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Fig. 8: Benefit in lying scenario.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the popularity of connected vehicle technology and
mobile payment, economic instruments can better serve het-
erogeneous vehicles with different values of time (VOT) in
intersection operations. Most papers consider the influence
of economic instruments from the perspective of system
optimization, but few papers analyze what the users’ concerns
are. When a new management method appears, users want
it to be easy to learn and operate, that it can save time or
money, and that it can reduce the rich-poor gap. We haven’t
analyzed the rich-poor gap in this paper but propose to do
so in future research. We found that auction mechanisms will
enlarge the rich-poor difference, and the other mechanisms
cannot guarantee a reduction of the gap.
Based on a comparative analysis, we found that the credit
scheme and free-market scheme can both benefit users. The
second price auction can only benefit high VOT vehicles.
However, considering the operational difficulties, a credit
scheme is not easy to learn and operate for travelers.
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